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Standard job search theory implies that more generous unemployment beneﬁts increase the
expected duration of unemployment spells until individuals accept a new job. This paper empiri-
cally analyzes the distribution of unemployment durations in West-Germany before and after the
reforms of unemployment beneﬁts during the mid 1980s. These reforms extended the maximum
entitlement periods for unemployment beneﬁts up to 32 months for elderly unemployed. The
paper uses the comprehensive IAB employment subsample. Since unemployment is not directly
observed in the data, we introduce two proxies: nonemployment (NE) and unemployment be-
tween jobs (UBJ). The analysis develops a theoretical framework in order to interpret diﬀerences
between nonemployment and unemployment between jobs.
The empirical analysis shows that the eﬀect of the reforms depend heavily on the deﬁnition of
unemployment. In particular, we ﬁnd that the risk of entering NE increased for the elderly after
the reform whereas the risk of entering UBJ remained basically constant. Also the average NE
duration for those individuals who were older than 53 years increased by 50% after the reform,
whereas the average NE duration decreased by 25% for those individuals who were younger than
42 years. Interestingly, the ratio of the average UBJ durations between these groups remained
constant. Surprisingly, we observe that the estimated survival functions (the survival function
as a function of duration T provides the share of those who are still unemployed after time T
among those who started out as unemployed) for remaining in UBJ did not change in response
to the reform. We only observe an increase for the mid 1990s recession which is also the case for
the younger unemployed. At the same time, the survival functions for remaining in NE increased
dramatically, in particular for the elderly.
We provide a theoretical framework that explains our ﬁndings and we conduct a simulation
study of the model which matches our empirical ﬁndings. We conclude that the NE duration for
the elderly increased due to an increase in early retirement, whereas the duration of UBJ did not
increase among those who were still looking for a new job.
Our empirical results suggest that the common result of job search theory, longer entitlement
periods for unemployment beneﬁts increase the time until the unemployed accepts a new job, is not
supported. Moreover, we do not observe that with longer entitlement periods for unemployment
beneﬁts individuals, who eventually ﬁnd a job, actually end up in more stable jobs or obtain
higher earnings. We conclude that the additional expenses by the German federal labor oﬃce for
the longer entitlement periods yield an advantage for two groups: companies, who disband their
elderly unemployed using subsidized early retirement packages and the elderly employees who lost
the incentive to look for a new job using the extensive early retirement packages. Since the elderly
employees did approve of such generous retirement packages, they didn’t insist on their dismissal
protection. This is a typical win–win situation on the expense of the general public.Unemployment Durations in West-Germany Before and
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Abstract
This paper analyzes empirically the distribution of unemployment durations in West-
Germany before and after the changes during the mid 1980s in the maximum entitlement
periods for unemployment beneﬁts for elderly unemployed. The analysis is based on the
comprehensive IAB employment subsample containing register panel data for about 500.000
individuals in West Germany. We analyze two proxies for unemployment since the data do
not precisely measure unemployment in an economic sense. We provide a theoretical analysis
of the link between the durations of nonemployment and of unemployment between jobs. Our
empirical analysis ﬁnds signiﬁcant changes in the distributions of nonemployment durations
for older unemployed individuals. At the same time, the distribution of unemployment
durations between jobs did not change in response to the reforms. Our ﬁndings are consistent
with an interpretation that many ﬁrms and workers used the more beneﬁcial laws as a part
of early retirement packages but those workers who were still looking for a job did not reduce
their search eﬀort in response to the extension of the maximum entitlement periods. This
interpretation is consistent with our theoretical model under plausible assumptions.
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Standard job search theory implies that longer entitlement periods for unemployment beneﬁts
increase the expected duration of unemployment spells until individuals accept a new job (see
Katz and Meyer, 1990, for a survey). A number of institutional changes in the West German
unemployment compensation system were enacted between 1985 and 1987.1 The probably most
important change was the extension of the maximum entitlement period for unemployment beneﬁts
in the case of elderly unemployed (table 1). The transition was stepwise over the years 1985-1987
for the diﬀerent age groups. Since the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment spells
starting in 1984 or later was also ex-post extended, it is expected to ﬁnd smoother transitions in
the data and not a single jump. The unemployment durations started in 1983 were the last to
which only the old law applied. The analysis here is about the eﬀects on unemployment durations
due to these reforms. The paper is highly policy relevant since a reduction in beneﬁt entitlement
periods is currently implemented by policy makers in Germany to eﬀectively undo most of the
institutional changes in the 1980s in an eﬀort to reduce the level of unemployment in Germany.
It is also an attempt to boost the labor market participation rate of the elderly which declined by
5 percentage points between 1980 and 1995 reaching its minimum (35%) between 1985 and 1991.
Several moderate legal changes between 1997 and 2001 intended making early retirement more
diﬃcult but the low labor force participation rate for the 55−64 years old persists (38% in 2002).
It is still lower than in many other OECD countries (OECD, 2003).
Starting with the seminal paper by Hunt (1995), a number of studies have already analyzed
empirically unemployment durations in West Germany before and after the reform under consid-
eration (see Hujer and Schneider, 1995, Steiner, 1997, Weber, 1999, and Plaßmann, 2002). Most
of these studies are based on the German Socio–Economic Panel (GSOEP).2 The authors typically
apply parametric (mixed-)proportional hazard models for a single spell of unemployment, in some
cases using a competing risks model allowing for exits to employment and to out–of–labor force.
In his inﬂuential recent survey, van den Berg (2001) stresses that single spell (mixed–) propor-
tional hazard models often yield unstable estimates and the results obtained should be interpreted
with extreme caution. In the literature, the reported estimates for the eﬀects of the reform diﬀer
substantially. Weber (1999) does not observe an ”unemployment generating” eﬀect of the un-
employment compensation system. In contrast, the other studies suggest that longer entitlement
periods for unemployment beneﬁts result in lower re-employment rates and therefore in longer
1For a detailed description of the German unemployment compensation system and of the conducted reforms,
see Hunt (1995) and Plaßmann (2002).
2Only Weber (1999) and Plaßmann (2002) use earlier versions of the IAB employment subsample.
3unemployment duration. Hunt (1995) ﬁnds that for workers aged 44-48 unemployment duration
increased strongly in comparison to younger workers. She also ﬁnds that the eﬀect for the 49-57
year-old workers was smaller. Hujer and Schneider (1996) ﬁnd that the age group 44-48 exhibits
signiﬁcantly smaller re-employment hazards compared to younger workers. Steiner (2001) and
Plaßmann (2002) have similar ﬁndings for elderly unemployed. Steiner (2001) concludes that the
results are in accordance with one of the main implications of job-search theory, i.e. unemployment
durations increase when entitlement periods are extended. There are also several contributions
with related topics using survey data from other countries. Empirical studies for the United States
suggest a positive eﬀect of the potential duration and the beneﬁts level on the expected duration
of unemployment (Katz and Meyer, 1990, and Solon, 1985). Narendranathan, Nickell and Stern
(1995) ﬁnd for Britain a positive elasticity of expected unemployment duration for men with re-
spect to the level of unemployment beneﬁts. The eﬀect depends on the age and is smaller for the
> 45 years old. They do not ﬁnd an impact for the long term unemployed. Van den Berg (1990)
obtains positive elasticities using data from the Netherlands in a non-stationary job search model.
The elasticities are greater after two years of duration time.
This paper involves a descriptive empirical analysis based on comprehensive German register
data, the IAB employment subsample, which contains panel data for about 500.000 individuals
for West-Germany during the period 1975-1997. We make use of the richness of the data and, in
contrast to the literature so far, we focus on descriptive, non–parametric estimates of the duration
of unemployment thus reducing the risk of misspecifying the empirical model. Due to the lack of
precise information on the length of unemployment in an economic sense, our analysis distinguishes
between the duration of nonemployment versus the duration of unemployment between jobs as
two benchmarks. Our ﬁndings suggest that the strong increases in maximum beneﬁt entitlement
periods for older workers in West-Germany during the 1980s did not extend the duration until
unemployed workers found a new job among those who were still looking for a new job. The
eﬀect was rather to extend the duration of nonemployment eﬀectively leading the way to early
retirement and withdrawal from the labor market. Furthermore, we develop a stylized theoretical
model to rationalize the diﬀerences between the two benchmarks for unemployment in the data and
to support our interpretation of the descriptive evidence. Finally, while our analysis focusses on
the duration of unemployment, we add some complementary evidence on employment before and
after unemployment. These extensions allow us to investigate whether our results on the duration
of unemployment are likely to be aﬀected by selection or composition eﬀects. Also, we address
some implications from search theory on the relationship between the duration of unemployment
and the quality of the job after unemployment.
Concretely, our ﬁndings are as follows: The median nonemployment duration for elderly unem-
4ployed (>53 years) almost doubled between 1981 and 1995, whereby the median nonemployment
duration of younger unemployed (<42 years) remained constant. At the same time, the me-
dian duration of unemployment between jobs remained almost constant over the period for all
age groups. In particular for exits from the manufacturing sector, the probability for staying in
nonemployment has increased for the elderly to a striking level of about 90%. This is probably
due to a sharp increase in the use of early retirement packages. The extension of the maximum en-
titlement of unemployment insurance has only a limited inﬂuence on the distribution of the length
of temporary unemployment durations, i.e. we do not observe that elderly individuals spend more
time in unemployment before they accept a new job. Moreover, if elderly unemployed accept a
new job, they do this more quickly than the younger unemployed. We also observe that the length
of employment spells after a period of unemployment between jobs did not increase for the age
groups with longer entitlements in comparison. Moreover, the post-unemployment earnings for
the aged 42−65 unemployed did not increase after the reform relative to the earnings of the aged
<42. This indicates that the match quality between employee and job has not improved after
the reforms. We conclude that the additional expenses by the German federal labor oﬃce yield
an advantage for two groups: companies, who disband their elderly unemployed using subsidized
early retirement packages and the elderly employees who lost the incentive to look for a new job
using the extensive early retirement packages.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the
institutions. Nonemployment and unemployment–between–jobs are deﬁned in section 3 as two
proxies for unemployment available in the data. Section 4 presents our main descriptive ﬁndings
on the durations for the two proxies and the changes induced by the reforms. A theoretical
model to analyze diﬀerences between the two proxies is developed in section 5. Section 6 provides
complementary evidence on employment before and after unemployment. Section 7 concludes and
the appendix contains further institutional information and the detailed empirical ﬁndings.
2 Data and Institutions
The empirical analysis uses the IAB Employment Subsample (IAB-Besch¨ aftigtenstichprobe 1975-
1997 [Regionalﬁle], IABS). A basic description of this data set can be found in Bender et al.
(2000).3 The data contain daily register data of about 500.000 individuals in West-Germany
on their employment spells and the spells during which they receive transfer payments from the
3These data are also used by Plaßmann (2002) to analyze unemployment duration. To sharpen our understand-
ing of the data generating process, one of the authors (R. Wilke) visited some unemployment oﬃces in diﬀerent
parts of West Germany.
5labor oﬃces. It is a representative sample of employment subject to social security taxation and,
therefore, it is not representative with respect to periods of nonemployment. Employment periods
are based on the register records of the public pension funds which obtain from the companies the
relevant information about employment spells subject to social security taxation. Periods of self
employment and employment as life-time civil servants (Beamte) are not included in the data.
Periods of registered unemployment – or economically more meaningful concepts of unemploy-
ment (e.g. according to the ILO standard) – can not be identiﬁed from the data. The German
federal labor oﬃce has added instead the periods in which the individuals obtain some kind of
income transfer payment. The data records spells involving the following three types of transfer
payments:
1. Unemployment beneﬁts UB (“Arbeitslosengeld”),
2. Unemployment assistance UA (“Arbeitslosenhilfe”), and
3. Income Maintenance during training IMT (“Unterhaltsgeld”). This is paid during partici-
pation in public sponsored training as a part of active labor market policy.
Our discussion of institutions refers to the setup between 1981 and 1997 which diﬀers from the
situation today.4 The analysis in this paper is restricted to the years 1981 to 1997 because the
information about spells with transfer payments is likely to be incomplete before that time, see
Bender et al. (2000) and the references given there.
The three types of transfer payments diﬀer with respect to the income replacement ratio and as
to whether they are means tested. UB as well as IMT are paid as certain percentage (between 60
and 67%) of past earnings and they are generally not means tested. UA involves a somewhat lower
replacement ratio (between 53 and 58% in the period of consideration) and it is means tested.
Provided that individuals had suﬃciently long employment spells before they become unemployed
they are eligible for UB for the maximum entitlement periods depicted in table 1. After the end
of the maximum entitlement periods, they would become eligible for the lower UA only if their
family had no other source of income and no wealth (means tested). Until 1997 also participation
in training did not only provide a source of income through receipt of IMT but it itself did also
renew the entitlement for UB – just as if the unemployed individual had been working.
4Also during the time period under consideration a number of changes were enacted in addition to the extension
of the beneﬁt entitlement periods. For instance, the income replacement ratios for UB and UA were reduced in the
case of unemployed individuals without children and increased in the case of unemployed individuals with children,
see Hunt (1995). The income replacement ratio for IMT was above the ratio for UB at the beginning. It was
reduced a number of times so that for most of the time period under consideration it was equal to the ratio for UB.
6Unfortunately, the data only involve spell information on the fact whether transfer payments
were received but do not provide the information on the level of these payments. Evidence
reported in Franz (2003, table 7.9) suggests that the actual replacement ratios are typically lower
than the nominal ratios mentioned above. This is mostly due to temporary (6–12 weeks) or
permanent sanctions (“Sperrzeiten”) which are mainly applied for two reasons. First, when an
unemployed worker quits voluntarily, he becomes eligible for UB only after a while. Second,
when an unemployed worker rejects an acceptable job oﬀer, he is punished by losing UB for a
while. The IABS reports these periods of no UB receipt as a late start or as interruption in
the spells of transfer payments. Wilke (2004a) provides a descriptive analysis of sanctions in the
IAB-Employment subsample.
In order to reduce the labor supply and “free jobs for young workers”, government policy
allowed receipt of UB as an intermediate step between employment and early retirement. While
being on UB, social security taxes were still paid for unemployed individuals and they were still
accumulating claims on social security payments after retirement. In addition, the discount on
social security payments after early retirement, i.e. before the oﬃcial retirement age at 65 years,
was actuarially biased in favor of early retirement (see table 1 in Berkel and B¨ orsch–Supan,
2003). Thus, during the mid 1980s receipt of UB was becoming the stepping stone towards early
retirement for workers at an age above 55 years (see Koller et al., 2003, for a recent account of
this). Hunt (1995) ﬁnds some evidence for this using survey data (GSOEP) but she does not
analyze this issue in detail.
The data provide no information on spells when an individual is registered as unemployed and
is not entitled to transfer payments from the labor oﬃces as well as whether she receives welfare
payments (“Sozialhilfe”). This is particularly relevant for an analysis of long–term unemployment
which in cases without transfer payments in the data can not be reasonably distinguished from
having left the labor force.
3 Proxies for Unemployment
Since the data does not allow for an economically meaningful, exact assessment as to whether an
individual is unemployed or out of labor force, we use the two extreme benchmarks nonemployment
and unemployment–between–jobs to analyze the changes in the duration of unemployment. The
common deﬁnition ”registered unemployment” cannot be used because there is not suﬃcient
information in the data. However, we know that the length of registered unemployment periods
is between our benchmarks by construction of the latter. The results of our empirical analysis
may therefore diﬀer to the case when registered unemployment is used in the analysis as for
7example done in the past GSOEP based contributions. However, in economic sense we do not see
why registered unemployment may have a better meaning than our two benchmarks which are
operationalized as follows:
1. Nonemployment (NE): all periods of nonemployment after an employment period which
contain at least one period with income transfers by the German federal labor oﬃce. The
nonemployment period is considered as censored if the last record involves a UB, UA, or
IMT payment that is not followed by an employment spell.5 In this case we do not know
whether the individual is still unemployed, out of labor force or maybe self-employed. With
this deﬁnition of unemployment we include the periods of nonemployment (out of the labor
force, social beneﬁts) which are not explicitly recorded in the data. From 1980 to 1997, a
total number of 371.317 nonemployment periods are observed in the IABS.
2. Unemployment between jobs (UBJ): all episodes between two employment spells during
which an individual continuously receives UB, UA, or IMT payments. Interruptions of these
payments can be up to four weeks – in the case of cut–oﬀ times: six weeks. With this
deﬁnition it is ensured that the individuals are continuously registered as unemployed. Note
that this sample does not include many registered unemployed, in particular long term
unemployed. From 1980 to 1997, a total number of 204.954 UBJ spells are observed in the
IABS.
These two deﬁnitions provide benchmarks on the length of unemployment taking account of the
fact that not all unemployed are successful in ﬁnding a new job during the period of observation
(therefore the UBJ deﬁnition can not be used alone) and of the fact that unemployed individuals
may leave the labor force. In order to proxy for the unemployment period when people eventually
leave the labor force, the NE deﬁnition assumes that unemployment ends after the exhaustion of
transfer payment and the only usable information is then that unemployment is right censored at
this point. However, this deﬁnition also entails the possibility that individuals might have left the
labor force earlier, i.e. they are not interested in a new job any more, and they just keep receiving
the transfer payments because the labor oﬃces can not sanction this behavior.6 The NE deﬁnition
also contains time gaps for individuals who may have left the labor force for some period.7 In
5A nonemployment spell is treated as right censored if it is not fully observed.
6See Wilke (2004a) for an analysis of sanctions when unemployed individuals do not take an acceptable job
oﬀer. This study shows that sanctions to a large extent seem ineﬀective due to a high withdrawal rate.
7Using a more informative data source which is not available to researchers outside of the BA, Stefan Bender
kindly provided us information about the status of individuals with unobserved periods before they start a new
employment spell. He found that almost 80% of these periods correspond to other transfer payments.
8contrast, the UBJ deﬁnition excludes cases where a job is found some time after the end of the
entitlement to transfer payments. This allows us to focus on the link between beneﬁt entitlement
periods and ﬁnding a job. The deﬁnition also excludes cases where people leave the labor force
after the end of the entitlement period and later ﬁnd a job. Section 5 analyzes the link between
the length of unemployment, NE, and UBJ based on a theoretical model.
4 Evidence on Unemployment Durations
This section presents the main descriptive empirical ﬁndings of the paper. We investigate the
durations of nonemployment and unemployment between jobs for diﬀerent age groups and dif-
ferent years. First, we present some raw evidence based on histograms and median lengths for
the observed, possibly censored durations as well as trends over time in the number of started
unemployment spells. Then, we provide Kaplan–Meier estimates of the survival functions taking
account of censoring in the observed durations.
4.1 Raw Evidence
For the unemployment spells starting at the begin of the considered period (1981) and at the end
of the available data (1994), the histograms in ﬁgure 1 present the empirical distributions over the
ﬁrst three years (≈ 1.095 calender days). The upper panel shows the nonemployment (NE) spells
and the lower panel the unemployment between jobs (UBJ) spells. The censored observations are
included in the distribution of NE durations. It is important to note that there are small mass
points at 12 months (1981 and 1994) and 32 months (1994) in the distribution of NE spells. These
mass points are directly related to the maximum UB entitlements periods: a considerable number
of NE spells are censored at the end of the UB entitlement period. Interestingly, mass points at
these durations are not observed for UBJ spells. This suggests that job searchers usually do not
wait until the exhaustion of their UB entitlement period before they accept a new job. Figure 2
presents the median unemployment duration for the age groups of table 1 from 1981 to 1995. It is
evident that median NE duration for > 53 years8 old unemployed almost doubled over this period
whereas it remained basically constant for the < 42 years old. For the other age groups, the median
NE duration remained constant during the 1980s and increased after the German reuniﬁcation
8The temporary decline in 1985 can be rationalized by the anticipation of the introduction of a more generous
early retirement policy in 1986. Since 1986, there exists the possibility for elderly unemployed (currently aged 59
or above) to receive unemployment beneﬁts – irrespective of their entitlement based on their employment history
– if they commit not to search for a new job.
9in the 1990s. This is most likely due to macroeconomic changes. Considering the median UBJ
durations, one observes the same variation due to the business cycle but, at the same time, the
older unemployed (> 53 years) leave unemployment faster than all other age groups. This property
does not change over time and is therefore not aﬀected by the reforms under consideration. Note
that ﬁgures for the years after 1995 are not reported due to the censoring of the data at the end
of 1997.
Table 2 reports the observed number of unemployment spells for the diﬀerent age groups. Most
noticeable is the sharp increase of the NE spells for the age group > 53 years, i.e. the inﬂows into
NE spells but not into UBJ spells have increased strongly over time. This ﬁnding corresponds to
our evidence on transitions from employment to unemployment in section 6.1.
4.2 Kaplan–Meier Estimates
This section presents estimates of survival functions, which report the probability of remaining in
NE and in UBJ, respectively, after a given duration. The Kaplan-Meier-estimator takes account of
the inherent censoring for NE durations. An upward movement (increase) of the survival functions
means that the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased.9
The following ﬁgures present selected representative survival function estimates for the 1980s
and 1990s (until 1995) for the age groups considered.10 Figure 3 (left, upper panel) shows that
the NE survival function did not change much for the < 42 years old. The estimated survival
curves are higher for bad years (1981,1994: bad in the sense of the labor market conditions) and
lower for good (see above) years (1985, 1990). For the age groups 42-43 and 44-48 we observe
similar changes apart from that survival functions increase in the labor market slowdown of the
mid 1990s (ﬁgure 3, left, middle and bottom). For the age group 49-53 the increase in the mid
1990s is sharper (ﬁgure 4, left, up). Considering the age group > 53, it is apparent that the NE
survival functions continuously increased over the 15 years under consideration and they did so
even in the boom year after the reuniﬁcation (ﬁgure 4, left, bottom). Interestingly, at the same
time, the UBJ survival curves of the elderly (> 53 years) remained almost constant(!) (ﬁgure 4,
right, bottom). We observe similar patterns for the other age groups and the survival curves in the
mid 1990s increased a bit for all groups including even the younger unemployed. It is not evident
from these results that the increase is due to the reform between 1985-1987. It seems to be caused
9A detailed Kaplan-Meier unemployment survival analysis of the West-German 26-41 aged workforce can be
found in Wilke (2004b).
10Due to the large sample sizes the corresponding conﬁdence bands are narrow. We did not add them because
this would aﬀect the readability of the graphs while the gain of information would be rather limited for our following
reasonings.
10by a structural change due to the unfavorable macroeconomic environment. Since the increase of
the UBJ survival functions is a bit greater for those aged 42-53 than for the young unemployed
it might be the case that the reform shows an eﬀect in a weak macroeconomic situation only.
Surprisingly, we do not observe this for the > 53 aged which is in line with the theoretical model
to be discussed in section 5 under plausible assumptions.
Our discussion of the diﬀerential shifts in the estimated survival function is conﬁrmed by the
diﬀerence–in–diﬀerences (DiD) estimates ˆ ∆t,t0 = ˆ St − ˆ St0 −(ˆ S0
t − ˆ S0
t0) evaluated at the observable
durations, where S0 is the survival function of the control age group < 42 and calendar years t>t 0.
DiD estimates for the UBJ survival functions are presented in ﬁgure 5. Controlling for common
time eﬀects, they contrast the before–after–reform changes in the estimated survival functions
for the elderly with the corresponding changes for the control group of younger workers <42 not
aﬀected by the reforms. While the DiD estimates for NE (the NE results are clear from ﬁgures
3-4 and not reported here; they are available upon request) show a strong upward movement of
the NE survival functions for the elderly, we do not observe such evidence for UBJ (if any, the
positive eﬀects we see, are considerably smaller for UBJ).
Figure 6 shows that the survival curves vary sharply over the sector of last employment before
entering unemployment. For the manufacturing sectors11, the survival curves for the age group
> 53 increased up to more than 0.9 after three years (ﬁgure 6, up, left), while this probability is
only about 0.6 for the other sectors 12 (ﬁgure 6, bottom, left). The sharp increase of the survival
functions, in particular in the manufacturing sector, is probably directly related to the massive
early retirement programs which were conducted at this time. Considering the survival functions
of those in UBJ (ﬁgure 6, right), the survival curves remained almost constant over time with
some increase in the manufacturing sector in the mid 1990s.
Considering the empirical survival functions for the age group > 53 years in ﬁgure 7, the
eﬀect of the reform on the observed length of NE becomes immediately apparent. The jumps
at the maximum length of UB entitlements are shifted to the right after the reform. This shift
is particularly obvious for the manufacturing sectors,13 where the empirical survival function is
shifted about 20 months to the right. The jumps for NE (being absent for UBJ) reﬂect that many
observed spells end at the maximum entitlement periods and are thus due to the administrative
rules. It follows that many elderly nonemployed then drop out of the labor force or they are not
11Production of durables, consumption goods and base materials.
12Agriculture, energy, mining, nutrition, construction, traﬃc, communication, services, public sector, with trade
excluded.
13During the period 1985 to 1987 the maximum length of entitlements was increased step by step from 12 to 32
months. This pattern is clearly visible in ﬁgure 7 (left).
11eligible for further unemployment beneﬁts. From ﬁgure 4 (right, bottom) it was already apparent
that most of them did not re-enter into regular employment.
5 Theoretical Considerations on the Length of Nonem-
ployment and Unemployment between Jobs
Ideally, our empirical analysis should investigate the determinants of unemployment within a com-
peting risk model. However, we cannot observe unemployment in the available data and, instead,
we analyze both nonemployment (NE) and unemployment–between–jobs (UBJ) as benchmarks.
This section treats both durations as the outcome of a competing–risks–model in order to discuss
the link between the duration of unemployment and to rationalize our ﬁndings on the diﬀerences
between NE and UBJ.
5.1 Basic model
The issue of linking the two proxies for unemployment is analyzed by means of the following
competing–risks–model
t = min(tE,t O)( 1 )
where t is the possibly unobserved unemployment duration,
tE is the time until a new job is taken, and
tO is the time until individual leaves the labor force.
Both deﬁnitions NE and UBJ provide possibly censored observations on the duration of unem-
ployment t. NE entails an information loss due to many individuals being right censored and due
to the possibility that individuals who are receiving transfer payments might not be searching for
a job any more. Otherwise NE involves no further restriction on the observability of t thus we
treat in the following t as the length of NE. In contrast, UBJ involves no right censored durations
but this deﬁnition conditions the observability of t on the outcome tE <t O.14
How is the economically meaningful concept of unemployment captured in this model and
what are the eﬀects we are looking for in our analysis of unemployment? Incentive eﬀects of
14In our empirical analysis, UBJ excludes cases where individuals ﬁnd a job some time after the end of their
beneﬁt entitlement. Therefore, it is to be expected that the distribution function of UBJ according to the deﬁnition
in the empirical analysis lies strictly to the left of the one for the deﬁnition used in the theoretical model. The main
insights gained from the theoretical model – as to be seen later – will therefore apply a forteriori to the relationship
between the empirical NE and UBJ distributions.
12unemployment beneﬁts derived from search theory operate mainly through the job ﬁnding duration
tE, which represents the economic concept of unemployment. However, it is conceivable that the
exit rate out of labor force is indirectly aﬀected by changes in unemployment beneﬁts, e.g. when
beneﬁts are extended it is rational to postpone an exit out of labor force. The eﬀects of stronger
incentives for early retirement by elderly workers are just opposite. Such incentives reduce the
duration until the exit out of labor force and, at the same time, they reduce the incentives to search
for a new job, thus increasing tE. What we are looking for in our empirical analysis is evidence for
such diﬀerential eﬀects on tE and tO. This evidence can only be indirect since tE and tO are not
directly observed. Instead of estimating a structural competing risks model requiring a number
of modeling assumptions, which are diﬃcult to justify based on ﬁrst principles, we investigate the
implication of this model on the observable NE and UBJ durations.
For simplicity of the argument, let us assume that both tE and tO are exponentially distributed,
independent random variables with hazard rates λE and λO, respectively. Then, it follows imme-
diately that t is exponentially distributed with hazard rate λ = λE + λO.15 This links the exit
rates to employment λE and to out–of–labor–force λO with λ as the exit rate of the duration of
the NE spells .
UBJ spells are observed conditional upon tE <t O, thus the following argument links λE and
λO to the duration of the UBJ spells. The probability that an observed UBJ spell is longer than
Ti sg i v e nb y 16
P(tE >T,t E <t O|tE <t O)=exp[−(λE + λO)T] .
Therefore, we obtain the possibly surprising result that UBJ and NE spell durations exhibit, in
fact, the same exponential distribution with exit rate λ = λE + λO. Both durations are therefore
aﬀected in the same way by changes in the determinants of the job ﬁnding rate λE and the exit
rate from the labor force λO.L e tSNE(T)a n dSUBJ(T) be the survival functions of the NE and
the UBJ durations, respectively, and let z be a variable aﬀecting λE and λO, then one obtains
∂SNE(T)
∂z
=
∂SUBJ(T)
∂z
= −T · exp[−(λE + λO)T]

∂λE
∂z
+
∂λO
∂z

. (2)
Based on this result, the eﬀects of an increase in unemployment beneﬁts or in incentives for
early retirement is ambiguous both for NE and UBJ durations. It is highly plausible that with
15To see this, note P(t>T)=P(tE >T) · P(tO >T)=exp(−λET) · exp(−λOT)=exp[−(λE + λO)T].
16To see this, note P(tE <t O)= λE
λE+λO and
P(tE >T,t E <t O)=
 ∞
T
 ∞
tE
λEexp(−λEtE)λOexp(−λOtO)dtO dtE =
λE
λE + λO
· exp[−(λE + λO)T].
13unemployment beneﬁts the eﬀect through tE dominates, i.e. NE and UBJ durations increase
in response to an extension of unemployment beneﬁts, and vice versa with incentives for early
retirement the eﬀect through tO dominates, thus, the introduction of early retirement beneﬁts
reduces both NE and UBJ durations.
The main result in this subsection, namely, that NE and UBJ durations exhibit the same
distribution is neither helpful to assess diﬀerential eﬀects on NE and UBJ duration nor to infer
something about the eﬀects on tE and tO durations. The equality of the NE and UBJ distribution
hinges critically on the absence of unobserved heterogeneity, as we will show in the next subsection.
Also a deviation from the assumption of a constant hazard rate for both risks results in diﬀerences
between NE and UBJ. The direction of the diﬀerence is ambiguous and this is something we do
not base our empirical analysis upon.17 For the clarity of the theoretical argument and because of
the economic plausibility of the importance of unobserved heterogeneity, we stick in the following
to the case of constant hazard rates. Finally, it has to be noted as well that the deﬁnition of NE
durations, when individuals do not ﬁnd a job (see previous section), also entails the possibility
that individuals might have left the labor force earlier than the end of transfer payments. This
eﬀect would result in an upward bias in the observed NE distribution.
5.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
Our subsequent empirical results show that the survival function of NE durations is larger than
that for UBJ durations for all subgroups considered. As indicated at the end of the last subsection,
this could be the outcome of a particular deviation from the assumption of a constant hazard rate
for both risks. Our focus lies, however, on the fact that unobserved heterogeneity, introduced in
a particular way, is consistent with our empirical ﬁndings.
The introduction of unobserved heterogeneity changes the comparison between the NE and
UBJ duration for the case of constant hazard rates, see Van den Berg (2001) for a recent survey
on duration models illustrating the importance of unobserved heterogeneity. We allow here for
the simplest distribution of unobserved heterogeneity just involving two types of workers, i.e. a
mass point distribution with two types.18 Assume for the hazard rates into employment and out
17Generally speaking, one obtains the intuitive result that the UBJ distribution lies strictly to the left (to the
right) of the NE distribution, if the distribution of te durations lies to the left (to the right) of to durations and the
variance of both distributions is small. The part about the variance is crucial because the result is just reversed
when variances are large. Simulation results of both types for lognormal distributions are available upon request.
18Diﬀerences in observed characteristics can be dealt with in standard ways by stratifying the data according to
the observed characteristics (or using regression type methods). The equality of the two distributions then holds
within each stratum.
14of labor force
λE(α)=¯ λE + α and λO(α)=¯ λO − l · α,
where α represents the unobserved heterogeneity part, ¯ λE and ¯ λO are the systematic parts of
the hazard rates, and 0 <l<1. This speciﬁcation involves a negative correlation between the
two hazard rates. It is plausible that unobserved characteristics which positively aﬀect the job
ﬁnding rate are negatively correlated with the propensity to leave the labor force. Since l<1, it
is also assumed that the eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate is stronger than on the exit rate from the
labor force. The setup here corresponds to the discussion of diﬀerential eﬀects on tE and tO in
the previous subsection. We assume a distribution with two mass points P(α = αj)=pj with
j =1 ,2, p1 + p2 =1 ,a n dα1 >α 2, i.e. the α1–type individuals are more likely to ﬁnd a job and
less likely to leave the labor force compared to the α2–types.
Based on the results above, the survival functions of the NE and the UBJ durations for the
diﬀerent α–types is given by
SNE(T|α)=SUBJ(T|α)=exp{−[¯ λE + ¯ λO +( 1− l)α]T} .
However, this does not imply that the distributions of the observed durations for which α is
integrated out are also the same. In fact, it is now shown that the survival function of NE
duration lies strictly to the right of the survival function of UBJ durations, i.e. SNE(T) >S UBJ(T)
for all T. Therefore, UBJ spells end more quickly than NE spells in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity.
To show this, note that for NE durations by the law of iterated expectations
SNE(T)=
2 
j=1
pjexp{−[¯ λE + ¯ λO +( 1− l)αj]T} .
To analyze the survival function for UBJ durations, note that
SUBJ(T)=P(tE >T|tE <t O)=
P(tE >T,t E <t O)
P(tE <t O)
.
For the two probabilities in the last expression, one obtains (see footnote 16)
P(tE <t O)=
2 
j=1
pj
¯ λE + αj
¯ λE + ¯ λO +( 1− l)αj
and
P(tE >T,t E <t O)=
2 
j=1
pj
¯ λE + αj
¯ λE + ¯ λO +( 1− l)αj
exp{−[¯ λE + ¯ λO +( 1− l)αj]T} .
15Hence,
SUBJ(T)=
2 
j=1
˜ pjexp{−[¯ λE + ¯ λO +( 1− l)αj]T} ,
with “adjusted weights”
˜ pj =
pj
¯ λE+αj
¯ λE+¯ λO+(1−l)αj
2
k=1 pk
¯ λE+αk
¯ λE+¯ λO+(1−l)αk
for j =1 ,2.
Since α1 >α 2, it follows that ˜ p1 >p 1 and ˜ p2 <p 2
19 and, therefore, SUBJ(T) <S NE(T). From
this result we can easily infer that an increase in the dispersion of α1 and α2 for given weights pj
with j =1 ,2 results in a larger diﬀerence between SUBJ(T)a n dSNE(T).
This result can be motivated as follows. Since we assume some form of unobserved hetero-
geneity which aﬀects UBJ durations more strongly than NE duration, the quicker exits of the
α1–types to employment results in the UBJ population having a larger share of α1–types than
the population of all individuals corresponding to the NE population. Therefore, on average the
individuals in the UBJ population exhibit shorter durations which is captured by the adjusted
weights ˜ pj.
To ﬁnish this subsection, how does the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity change the
comparative statics for the observed NE and UBJ survival functions? It is clear, that for NE
durations
∂SNE(T)
∂z is just a weighted average of expressions as in equation (2) where the weights
are the probabilities pj. For UBJ duration,
∂SUBJ(T)
∂z also involves the eﬀect of a change in z on
the adjusted weights ˜ pj. It is therefore not possible to sign unambiguously the diﬀerence between
the changes in the two durations. For instance, a reduction in job ﬁnding rates ¯ λE can possibly
result in a stronger increase of NE durations compared to UBJ durations.
5.3 Simulation results
Anticipating our major empirical ﬁnding, for older individuals NE durations but not UBJ durations
have became relatively longer compared to younger individuals between the 1980s and 1990s. How
can this ﬁnding be rationalized within our model setup in light of the policy changes discussed in
the introduction? This subsection illustrates a plausible mechanism by means of a simulation of
our model.
19This result follows from the simple fact that
1−x
a−x(1−l)
1+y
a+y(1−l)
< 1
for a>1, x,y > 0, l>0, provided that the expressions 1 − x, a − x(1 − l), and a + y(1 − l) are strictly positive.
16For the simulation, we assume that there exist two subgroups of workers, the treatment group
(the older workers) and the control group (the younger workers).20 These two groups can be
identiﬁed in the data. We make the economically plausible assumption that for the treatment
group, the job ﬁnding rates are lower and the exit rates out of the labor force are larger compared
to the control group, i.e. the speciﬁc hazard rates used for the simulation are given by
λE =0 .3+α(TREAT)a n dλO =0 .2 − 0.4 · α(TREAT)
and TREAT = 1 for the treatment group and TREAT = 0 for the control group. Further, an
individual belongs with probability 0.5 to either the treatment or the control group. Concretely,
we assume
α(TREAT)=

α1 = 0 with probability p1 =0 .5 irrespective of treatment status
α2(TREAT) with probability p2 =0 .5
where α2(0) = −0.1a n dα2(1) = −0.14. For the α2–types in the treatment group, the policy
change increases the propensity to leave the labor force and it decreases the job ﬁnding rate.
There is no change for the control group as well as for the α1–types in the treatment group. Also,
the share of α2–types does not change in either group.
This setup is motivated by the following interpretation of the actual policy changes in Germany.
For older individuals, the combination of an extension of unemployment beneﬁts and an increase
of incentives for early retirement did strongly increase the propensity to leave the labor force
and reduce the job ﬁnding rate for the subgroup of individuals characterized by low labor force
attachment (“α2–types”). In contrast, older individuals with a high labor force attachment (“α1–
types”) were barely aﬀected by these changes.
We simulate the above model for a random sample of 400,000 observations to obtain a good
estimate of the survival functions implied by the model. The results are depicted in ﬁgure 8. The
ﬁrst two graphs provide the survival functions of NE and UBJ durations both for the treatment
and the control group before and after the simulated policy change, respectively. Before the policy
change, the NE survival curve is strictly to the right of the UBJ survival curve for both groups but
for the control group this diﬀerence is not visible. After the change, the diﬀerence between NE and
UBJ is larger for the treatment group. This is to be expected since the dispersion of the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution increases. The third graph shows that the NE survival function for the
treatment group moves strictly to the right. In contrast, and possibly surprising at ﬁrst glance,
20These labels are motivated by the fact that older workers were aﬀected by various policy changes. Both
incentives for early retirement and unemployment beneﬁt entitlement periods did increase strongly over time for
this group.
17the UBJ survival function moves strictly to the left for the most part of the distribution and the
change is strongest in the upper part of the distribution. Thus, our modelling setup implies an
increase in NE durations and no increase (in fact a decline) in UBJ durations even though the job
ﬁnding rates decline for a subgroup of workers.
The substance of our result, namely that NE durations increase more strongly than UBJ du-
rations, does not change when we allow the share of α2–types to increase (this is likely to occur
since older individuals might increasingly become unemployed due to stronger early retirement
incentives) and when the job ﬁnding rate also declines for the α1–types due to the longer beneﬁt
entitlement periods (the latter eﬀect is likely to be small since the vast majority of UBJ dura-
tions are considerably shorter than the longer beneﬁt entitlement periods). We investigated the
sensitivity of the results by further simulations which are available upon request.
6 Evidence on Employment before and after Unemploy-
ment
Our descriptive ﬁndings in section 4 might be aﬀected by selection or composition eﬀects. For
instance, the group of elderly unemployed who end up ﬁnding a job might have become more
selective in response to the reforms. The latter should show up in a higher quality of employment
before and after unemployment, i.e. in higher employment stability or in higher wages. Also
search theory would suggest that the quality of employment after unemployment increases when
longer entitlement periods reduce search costs. To gauge the validity of our interpretation of the
descriptive ﬁndings in section 4, this section provides complementary descriptive evidence on the
changes in employment before and after unemployment. In light of this limited goal, this section
does not attempt a comprehensive analysis of employment before and after unemployment.
6.1 Transitions from Employment to Unemployment
Elderly workers in West-Germany enjoy substantial employment protection in the period under
investigation which is codiﬁed in the German law for dismissal protection. In practice, it is
very diﬃcult to lay oﬀ elderly employees with long elapsed employment duration.21 The risk of
unemployment for this group of individuals should therefore be quite low. It is also important
to mention that since 1986 there exists the possibility for elderly unemployed (currently aged
21§ 1 KSchG ‘Law on employment protection’ prohibits dismissals which are ‘socially not justiﬁed’. This gives a
higher degree of protection for elderly workers with long elapsed employment duration.
1859 or above) to receive unemployment beneﬁts – irrespective of their entitlement based on their
employment history – if they commit not to search for a new job. Elderly unemployed therefore
have the option to receive unemployment beneﬁts until they are entitled for transfers from the
pensions system and during this period they are not counted as unemployed in the oﬃcial statistics.
Figure 9 presents the exit rates from employment to unemployment by age for 40 to 62 year
old employees based on the two deﬁnitions of unemployment in selected years with rather diﬀerent
macroeconomic conditions.22 It becomes apparent that the risk of UBJ is almost independent of
the age of the unemployed and of the year, whereas the risk of NE varies sharply. First, the risk of
NE shows a peak between age 55 and 59. In 1981, the peak is only evident for age 59. In 1985 and
1990 the size of the peak declines but the dispersion increases and it shifts to the left. The shift
to the left and the increased dispersion are due to the extension of the unemployment insurance
payment. This is because even workers who loose their job at age 55 after the reform are able to
reach the critical age limit 59 without interruption of unemployment beneﬁts transfers. In 1995,
the size of the peak sharply increases. This is due to the recession in the mid 1990s. Moreover,
the 55-60 aged employees exhibit uniformly higher risks of NE. The risk of NE is particularly high
in the manufacturing sector and even in the public sector the risk of nonemployment increased in
the 1990s (see ﬁgure 10). In table 3, we calculate the length of previous employment for employees
who enter NE or UBJ. It is evident that, in particular, elderly employees with exits to NE exhibit
very long previous employment spells. Over time, the length of previous employment increases
and again the increase is strongest for the elderly. In manufacturing this occurs for all groups in
the age range 44 and above while in the public sector we see this only for the group >53. At the
same time we do not observe this for employees entering UBJ.
The diﬀerent results for the two deﬁnitions of unemployment suggest that in particular, in bad
economic circumstances unemployment beneﬁts are used as an integral part in early retirement
packages. Due to the reform of the maximum entitlement period, the peak of the NE risk shifted
to the left, i.e. the early retirement is oﬀered to the employees several years earlier. Moreover,
since the reform the ratio of the UBJ risk relative to the NE risk decreased in particular for the
elderly (see ﬁgure 11). For the age group > 53, this ratio decreased by 50% from 1985 until 1995,
whereas the decrease for the other age groups (apart from the group 49-53) is in the range of 15%.
This shows that even in the years with quite favorable macroeconomic conditions (1985, 1990) the
overall ratio of employees aged >53 entering UBJ given that they enter NE has decreased after
the reform.
22See Wilke (2004) for a more detailed analysis of the impact of changing macro conditions on the risk of
unemployment for the 26-41 aged workforce.
196.2 Employment Stability and Wages after Unemployment
Employment after unemployment could be aﬀected by the policy change and by changes in the
composition of UBJ transitions over time. This can be assessed by analyzing the length of the fol-
lowing employment spells (employment stability) and the changes in earnings after unemployment
compared to before unemployment. Also, search theory would suggest that the match quality of
employment after unemployment increases, resulting for instance in higher employment stability
or in a higher wage, when longer entitlement periods for unemployment beneﬁts reduce search
costs. Figure 12 reports the median23 of the length of employment spells after UBJ. The evidence
does not show improvement for the elderly over time compared to the younger unemployed, see
also the corresponding evidence in ﬁgure 13 for the estimated survival functions. It is also ap-
parent that the median is highest for 1988 because employment stability was highest during the
reuniﬁcation boom with low unemployment rates during the time period 1990 to 1992.
Now, we turn to the wage as another indicator for the quality of the subsequent match. Denote
wp as the wage of the unemployed in the previous employment and denote wf as the wage in the
future employment. In the following, let us consider the transition from the position of wp in the
wage distribution (F) in the year when the unemployment spell begins (t1) to the position of wf
in F in the year when the unemployment spell ends (t2). Denote ∆Ft1 = Ft2(wf) − Ft1(wp)a s
the change in the position in the wage distribution. ∆Ft has an intuitive meaning: it is negative
(positive) if the future wage is in a lower (higher) position in the population wage distribution
than the previous wage. An extension of the maximum entitlements period should allow the
unemployed to spend more time in waiting for the same job oﬀer compared to an individual
without extended entitlements. This should increase the expected ∆Ft for the treated individuals
and therefore result in a shift of the distribution of ∆Ft to the right.
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for ∆Ft for the full time employees in the diﬀerent
age groups. It is evident that the distributions for the age groups are almost time invariant.24
The increase of the maximum entitlement period is not associated with a shift of the distributions
for the treated individuals to the right. The changes in the distributions are mainly due to the
business cycle. Surprisingly, between 50 − 60% of the considered group of unemployed reach
after the unemployment period a higher position in the wage distribution compared to before
unemployment.
Another way to assess the impact of the reform on future earnings is to use a diﬀerence–in–
23The median is chosen because many long employment spells are censored at the data end of 1997. This aﬀects
in particular the average values in the 1990ties.
24Nonparametric density estimates of the distributions are also time invariant over 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1994.
20diﬀerences method by including age dummies in a regression model. The following Tobit regression
model is estimated:
log(w
∗
f)=α + β
 x1 + γ
 1 Iage group, year + δ
 x2 +  ,
where w∗
f =m i n {wf,c}, x1 is a vector of exogenous observable variables, and x2 is a vector of
variables which control for the unobserved heterogeneity (such as the wage wp in the previous job,
the duration of unemployment, and unemployment experience). 1 Iage group, year is a 14 × 1 dummy
vector for the age groups, the calender years and the cross terms, i.e. the treatment eﬀects (see
table 4 for details). We choose the untreated individuals (aged <42) and the year before the
reform (1981) as reference category.   is the error term. The censoring of the wage distribution
from above (c is the topcoding value) is due to the upper threshold for social security taxation
above which wages are not reported. Two models are estimated: one basic model, where the error
term is in fact the convolution of   and the unobserved heterogeneity, and one model that controls
for x2 as proxying unobserved heterogeneity. From the results in table 5 it is not apparent that
the reform of the maximum entitlements periods had an eﬀect on the earnings of the elderly, since
none of the estimated coeﬃcients for the treatment eﬀects are signiﬁcantly positive and just one
of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients indicate a positive treatment eﬀect (age 44-48 in 1985). These results
are in contrast to Gangl (2002) who ﬁnds based on the GSOEP that more generous payments of
unemployment beneﬁts weakens the negative eﬀect of unemployment on the quality of employment
after unemployment.
Summarizing, at a descriptive level, there is no evidence, among the elderly, for a higher quality
of the job after unemployment regarding employment stability or higher wages. Therefore, it is
not likely that search has become more eﬃcient in response to the extension of beneﬁt entitlement
periods and, at the same time, it is not likely that the group of elderly workers with UBJ transitions
has become a more positive selection after the reform. We take this as complementary evidence
supporting our interpretation of the descriptive ﬁndings in section 4.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides a descriptive analysis of the duration of nonemployment and unemployment
between jobs in West Germany. We investigate the eﬀects of the extensions in the maximum
entitlement period for unemployment beneﬁts for older workers during the mid 1980s. The analysis
develops a theoretical framework in order to interpret diﬀerences between nonemployment and
unemployment between jobs. Our analysis of the duration of unemployment is complemented by
descriptive evidence on employment before and after unemployment.
21Our main empirical result is that the duration of nonemployment for elderly unemployed
increased sharply after the reform under consideration whereas the duration of unemployment
between jobs does not seem to be aﬀected. This is probably because unemployment beneﬁts were
used as an integral part of early retirement packages. With the reform, private ﬁrms - and even
the public sector - obtained a convenient instrument in order to disband elderly employees with
the help of social compensation plans. Since the elderly employees did approve of such generous
retirement packages, they didn’t insist on their dismissal protection. This is a typical win–win
situation at the expense of the general public. An increase in the usage of early retirement is also
strongly suggested both by the increase in the inﬂows of elderly workers into nonemployment,
especially in the economic recession after the reform, compared to the fact that inﬂows of the
elderly into unemployment between jobs did not rise after the reform. As already emphasized by
the seminal study of Hunt (1995), our results imply that it is indispensable to distinguish between
the ﬂows out of labor force and the ﬂows back into employment among the elderly (>53 years)
unemployed.
One striking aspect of our descriptive results is that the duration of unemployment between
jobs among the elderly did not increase for this group, which is in contrast to the ﬁndings of Hunt
(1995) and others in the literature. In fact, the behavior of the unemployed who are willing to
accept a new job before and after the reform does not seem to be aﬀected by the reform considered
here. Our results also suggest that the varying macroeconomic environment may aﬀect the job
search behavior for the considered age groups in a diﬀerent manner. Because of the descriptive
nature of our analysis, it is not possible to estimate how many unemployed were induced not
to accept a new job at all due to the reform. Finally, our results suggest that extended beneﬁt
entitlements for unemployed did not result in a better job match regarding higher employment
stability or higher earnings. Put diﬀerently, this suggests that, among the elderly, the selection of
those unemployed who found a new job did not change in response to the reform. Further research
using more structural methods at the cost of strong identifying assumptions will be useful to assess
whether our descriptive results are robust with respect to selection problems.
22Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Maximum entitlements for unemployment beneﬁts (UB) before and after the
reform (in months).
Age group until December 1984 January 1985 - January 1986- from July 1987
December 1985 December 1987
<42 12 12 12 12
42-43 12 12 12 18
44-48 12 12 16 22
49-53 12 18 20 26
>53 12 18 24 32
Source: Bundesgesetzblatt 1983–1988, Hunt (1995)
Table 2: Number of observed unemployment durations starting in the respective
year
Age group 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
Nonemployment (NE)
<42 16.281 16.401 16.262 15.738 13.115 12.848 16.144 14.810
42-43 839 792 640 503 500 547 776 746
44-48 1.551 1.915 1.875 1.623 1.235 1.141 1.578 1.613
49-53 1.112 1.256 1.382 1.526 1.292 1.400 1.755 1.332
>53 1.826 1.906 1.846 1.900 1.709 2.117 3.168 3.033
Unemployment between Jobs (UBJ)
<42 9.493 9.677 10.544 9.989 8.134 7.185 9.241 8.093
42-43 538 498 435 333 330 326 420 392
44-48 993 1.195 1.299 1.098 780 640 867 875
49-53 619 723 938 934 841 785 822 595
>53 672 715 816 710 579 582 684 672
23Table 3: Median of length of previous employment spell (in months)
NE UBJ
all sectors manufacturing public sector all sectors
1985 1990 1994 1985 1990 1994 1985 1990 1994 1985 1990 1994
<42 20 18 24 24 22 39 12 16 19 12 11 13
42-43 16 13 26 26 26 58 12 12 12 10 10 14
44-48 12 12 30 19 42 105 10 12 24 10 10 12
49-53 11 12 48 37 37 164 9 9 14 9 9 12
>53 53 72 169∗ 64∗ 123∗ 172∗ 10 10 139 9 10 10
*: censoring limit (1st JAN 1980)
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the computed ∆Ft(w): average values, sample variances
in brackets and the percentage of observations with positive value.
Age group 1981 1985 1990 1994
<42 0.0295 (0.0362) 0.0369 (0.0348) 0.0415 (0.0362) 0.0198 (0.0345)
> 0 59% 61% 61% 57%
42-43 −0.0019 (0.0285) −0.0137 (0.0344) −0.0017 (0.0347) −0.0153 (0.0393)
> 0 54% 51% 54% 50%
44-48 −0.0083 (0.0293) −0.0088 (0.0340) −0.0006 (0.0350) −0.0238 (0.0384)
> 0 54% 53% 53% 47%
49-53 −0.0032 (0.0270) −0.0244 (0.0301) 0.0080 (0.0275) −0.0364 (0.0397)
> 0 55% 50% 57% 48%
>53 −0.0025 (0.0286) −0.0184 (0.0268) 0.0125 (0.0230) −0.0067 (0.0347)
> 0 57% 48% 59% 55%
24Table 5: Results of Tobit regression of wage in new job after unemployment.
basic model unobserved heterogeneity
variable t-value t-value
const 4.1650∗ 667.8544 2.7641∗ 123.5678
female −0.2701∗ -51.2730 −0.1507∗ -29.3110
married 0.1477∗ 29.9222 0.0630∗ 14.0086
female * married −0.1768∗ -20.8681 −0.1493∗ -19.5119
citizenship −0.0342∗ -5.0147 −0.0436∗ -7.0584
skilled 0.1556∗ 37.5522 0.0400∗ 10.3488
university degree 0.4897∗ 36.0653 0.2518∗ 19.9314
log(wp)- 0 .3594∗ 69.1368
wp left-censored - 1.1017∗ 41.9865
wp right-censored - 1.9586∗ 64.7698
length of unemployment spell - −0.0000∗ -4.3668
recently unemployed before - −0.0490∗ -12.5614
previously recalled - 0.0674∗ 13.9588
age group 42-43 0.0966∗ 5.4078 0.0316∗ 1.9601
age group 44-48 0.0566∗ 4.1460 0.0071 0.5746
age group 49-53 0.0374∗ 2.2172 −0.0076 -0.5048
age group >53 0.0614∗ 3.8126 0.0013 0.0904
age group 42-43 × 1985 -0.0215 -0.8038 −0.0281 -1.1647
age group 44-48 × 1985 0.0354∗ 1.9736 0.0115 0.7095
age group 49-53 × 1985 0.0357 1.6648 0.0036 0.1882
age group 42-43 × 1990-1994 −0.0810∗ -3.2872 −0.0639∗ -2.8703
age group 44-48 × 1990-1994 0.0156 0.8739 0.0061 0.3799
age group 49-53 × 1990-1994 0.0328 1.6122 0.0183 1.0050
age group >53 × 1985-1994 0.0035 0.1861 −0.0043 -0.2536
1985 0.1083∗ 18.5624 0.0791∗ 15.2591
1990 0.2880∗ 45.4523 0.1909∗ 33.7011
1994 0.4030∗ 65.4637 0.2517∗ 44.5560
σ2 0.1302 0.1066
Log-likelihood −15218.172 −11582.154
Nobs, Nvars 37438, 21 37438, 27
# of censored 171 171
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Figure 1: Histogramm of the length of observed unemployment durations in 1981 and 1994.
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Figure 2: Evolution of median unemployment duration (in months)
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier-survival function estimates
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Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier-survival function estimates
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Figure 5: Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates for UBJ survival functions
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Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier-survival function estimates stratiﬁed by business sectors
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Figure 7: Empirical survival function estimates for age group > 53 years stratiﬁed by business
sector
30Figure 8: Simulation Results regarding survival functions of NE and UBJ durations
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Figure 9: Average risk of unemployment as a function of the age
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Figure 10: Average risk of nonemployment in selected business sectors
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Figure 11: Average risk of unemployment between jobs given nonemployment
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Figure 12: Median of employment spells after UBJ in days for respective years (left), unemploy-
ment rates for West-Germany (right)
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Figure 13: Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates for employment spells after UBJ in days for
respective years
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